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Abstract. Virtual interactions are normally assumed to be separate and 
distinct from the “real world,” yet they are also situated within material 
reality. In this paper I propose that a situated approach to understanding 
virtuality can be developed through drawing from Goffman’s Frame 
Analysis (1974/1986). I explain how Goffman’s terminology and concepts 
afford a way of integrating the study of virtual interaction with the study 
of social interaction more generally. His frame analysis approach offers 
constructs useful for distinguishing virtual worlds from each other and 
from real worlds in a way that is consonant with perspectives on human-
computer interaction. His language can help to account for the 
phenomenon of immersion in virtual worlds; and it is well suited for 
understanding co-present and mediated social interaction at the same time. 
I conclude by discussing some limitations of this approach and suggesting 
directions for further research. 
1 Introduction 
RW, an acronym for the ‘Real World’ commonly used inside virtual spaces to refer 
to the non-virtual world, implies that the material world is separate and distinct from 
virtual worlds. Yet people engaged in virtual action, whether virtual work, online 
games, or simply electronic communication, are situated in the real world and using 
material technology. The importance of the local and the “real” relative to virtuality 
has been stressed by Woolgar in his chapter on “rules of virtuality” [1].1
 
1 Four of Woolgar’s [1] five rules reference “real” or “local” (emphases added): 
  Such a 
(1) The uptake and use of the new technologies depend crucially on local social context. 
(3) Virtual technologies supplement rather than substitute for real activities. 
(4) The more virtual the more real. 
(5) The more global the more local. 
Chapter in Virtuality and Virtualization. Crowston, K., S. Sieber and E. Wynn, Eds. Springer 2007.  
2 Jo Ann Brooks 
 
local, material perspective is consistent with the tradition of situated approaches to 
the use of information and communication technology (ICT)–stretching back at least 
as far as Suchman’s Plans and Situated Action [2].  
Virtual activity is normally grounded in real-world actions such as tapping 
fingers on a keyboard, directing gaze at a monitor, and moving a computer mouse (or 
other physical control). While rarified forms of virtual experience such as ‘virtual 
reality caves’ are becoming outnumbered by situated instances of virtual teams, 
virtual organizations, and virtual workplaces for business; virtual spaces and 
interactions are becoming even more tightly integrated with the “real world.”   
Although virtual action is situated at least partially in the local, material world, it 
is clear that something else (i.e. something ‘virtual’) is also going on. Users interact 
with technology acting as if distant or abstract resources are local. The question from 
a situated perspective then is, “How is it that participants situated in a local material 
environment are able to think and act as if they’re working in a team or organization 
or other simulation with others who are not physically co-located?” More succinctly 
the question might be, “How do people understand what is virtually going on in their 
virtual environments?”  
Phenomenological approaches applied to virtuality, such as Heidegger’s [3] 
“ready-to-hand” and “present-at-hand” and Polanyi’s [4] proximal and distal aspects 
of the tacit dimension can explain individual experience but remain essentially 
individualistic and offer little explanation of the interface between virtual activity 
and situated social interaction.  
In this paper, I propose that socially situated aspects of virtuality can be 
understood and explained using Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis: An Essay on the 
Organization of Experience [5] in a way that supports a broader understanding of the 
relation between virtuality and social interaction. Much of Goffman’s research 
examines situated interaction – how people interact with each other in co-present 
situations. And since virtual experience entails situated action – including human-
computer interaction and mediated social interaction – Goffman’s work on situated 
social interaction seems a promising place to start shedding light on situated aspects 
of virtual/mediated social interaction.  
Frame Analysis is one of Goffman’s most relevant works for understanding 
virtuality because it readily addresses ‘frames of reference’ more generally. Such 
perspectives are well developed in social science (where they are often referred to as 
“interpretive frames”) and are reflected in the information systems literature at least 
as far back as Orlikowski & Gash’s [6] work on “technological frames.”  Orlikowski 
& Gash provide an extensive review of the socio-cognitive literature on frames and 
define technological frame as “a core set of assumptions, expectations, and 
knowledge of technology collectively held by a group or community” [6, p. 199]. 
They also note how ‘congruence’, or alignment of frames on key elements across 
stakeholders, is correlated with shared expectations across these same groups.  
Goffman’s Frame Analysis is therefore relevant to understanding virtuality 
because he uses a situated perspective, because he is concerned with interaction – 
especially social interaction, and because frames are a convenient way of 
understanding virtual perspectives. I start with an overview of Goffman’s [5] work 
on frames and demonstrate how several important aspects of virtuality can be well-
accounted-for by his approach: the non-virtual “Real World,” the meaning of 
simulated images and processes,  immersion in simulated images and processes, and 
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virtual social interaction. I then discuss how this approach fits in with a larger 
perspective on virtuality, and conclude with suggestions for further research. 
2 Goffman’s Frame Analysis 
In Frame Analysis, Goffman sets out a bold and ambitious agenda, “My aim is to try 
to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for 
making sense out of events and to analyze the special vulnerabilities to which these 
frames of reference are subject” (10).2
Goffman posits that in any human, and especially social, activity, a 
correspondence exists between the organization of the activity and how that activity 
is perceived (the current frame of understanding).
 The phrase ‘framework of understanding’ 
refers to psychological schemata of interpretation that an individual brings to a 
situation, based on prior experience/learning that normally enable the individual to 
come to terms with that situation. It also refers to the way that people understand and 
describe what it is that is going on in social interaction (8).  
3
 
  For this, he draws from the work 
of Gregory Bateson [7] highlighting the role of psychological frames in perception 
and linking them to Gestalt psychology. Bateson notes: 
Psychological frames are exclusive….[and] inclusive. From the point of 
view of set theory these two functions are synonymous, but from the point 
of view of psychology it is necessary to list them separately. The frame 
around a picture, if we consider this frame as a message intended to order 
or organize the perception of the viewer, says, ‘Attend to what is within 
and do not attend to what is outside.’  Figure and ground, as these terms 
are used by Gestalt psychologists, are not symmetrically related as are the 
set and nonset of set theory. Perception of the ground must be positively 
inhibited and perception of the figure (in this case the picture) must be 
positively enhanced. [7, p.187] 
 
In other words, perception highlights some aspects of an activity while it de-
emphasizes or even ignores others. Bateson also notes that psychological frames are 
related to “premises” that tell the viewer what kind of thinking to use; where premise 
“denote[s] a dependency of one idea or message upon another” [7, p. 186].4
Building on Bateson’s concept of frame and his identification of premises as 
dependencies, Goffman posits that at any single moment one set of correspondences 
informs perception and other possible mappings do not. This despite “the fact that 
there are likely to be many valid principles of organization that could but don’t 
inform perception” (26). He refers to the specific correspondences or dependencies 
in effect as organizational premises. These organizational premises, or “principles of 
organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective 
 
 
2 Page numbers without references are to Goffman’s Frame Analysis [5]. 
3 Whether the correspondence is “accurate” or not is another matter; suffice it for now to 
consider that some correspondence exists. The possibility of totally random perception and 
activity is unlikely enough in most work environments. 
4 Bateson notes “that the ‘premise’ relation in psychology is likely to be intransitive” [7: p. 
186]: i.e. the coexistence of dependencies between A and B, and between B and C, does not 
necessarily imply dependency between A and C. 
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involvement in them” constitute Goffman’s definition of the “frame” of an activity 
(10-11).5  He notes that these organizational premises are “sustained both in the mind 
and in activity” and something that human cognition “arrives at, not something 
cognition creates or generates” (247). 6
Following Goffman therefore, we can understand the ‘frame’ of an activity as the 
set of correspondences between the organization of the activity and the organization 
of the framework of understanding, as portrayed in Figure 1. 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between Framework of Understanding, Frame, and Activity 
 
In other words: 
 
o A framework of understanding (interpretive frame) shapes the meaning of 
an activity or event, enabling description of it, and informing / regulating 
the person’s activity. 
 
o A frame is comprised of the organizational premises (dependencies) 
between the organization of activity or an event, and the organization of 
subjective experience. 
 
Having clarified these differences, Goffman proceeds to employ ‘frame’ as 
synonymous with ‘framework of understanding’ elsewhere in his book; nevertheless, 
the distinction appears useful and I retain it.  
 
5 Although in at least one case he hedges slightly, stating “frame is the word I use to refer to 
such of these basic elements as I am able to identify. That is my definition of frame” (11; 
emphasis added). 
6 “It has been argued that a strip of activity will be perceived by its participants in terms of the 
rules or premises of a primary framework. These frameworks are not merely a matter of mind 
but correspond in some sense to the way in which an aspect of the activity itself is organized – 
especially activity directly involving social agents. Organizational premises [dependencies] are 
involved, and these are something cognition arrives at, not something cognition creates or 
generates. Given their understanding of what it is that is going on, individuals fit their actions 
to this understanding and ordinarily find that the ongoing world supports this fitting. These 
organizational premises – sustained both in the mind and in activity – I call the frame of the 
activity.” (247)   
 
Activity Framework of  
Understanding  
(Perception  
          of Activity) 
Frame  
   (of 
Activity) 
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In a simple case of virtuality such as ‘flying’ a flight simulator then, Goffman’s 
concept ‘frame’ highlights the visual perception of what is displayed on the screen 
and de-emphasizes perception of other bodily movements including (and perhaps 
especially) manipulating controls. In this example, the organizational premises are 
the correlations (resemblances) between aspects of the visual display and subjective 
experiences associated with real world geographic terrain and airspace.  
3 The Non-Virtual “Real World”  
The term “virtuality” has meaning only in contrast to that which is non-virtual; as 
Giddens [8] notes, technologically-mediated relationships presuppose familiarity 
with co-present relationships. It therefore must be possible to describe the material 
world and co-present interaction in a grounded and situated way that still enables 
distinctions between virtual worlds and the real world. To ground the ensuing 
discussion of virtuality, I next focus on how Goffman’s Frame Analysis approach 
can be used to describe “real world” (non-virtual) frames of reference relative to 
virtual reality.  
While innumerable frameworks or interpretive frames can exist for 
understanding any set of events, Goffman distinguishes “primary frameworks” as the 
interpretive schemata that people rely on for understanding what is “really” going 
on: “Actions framed entirely in terms of a primary framework are said to be real or 
actual, to be really or actually or literally occurring” (47). This contrasts with other 
more layered interpretations of a situation considered to be further removed from 
‘reality,’ such as the enactment of a story in the staging of a play, or the deception 
practiced by a con artist. In the case of someone who is otherwise immersed in a 
virtual world, descriptions such as ‘tapping one’s fingers on a keyboard’, ‘directing 
one’s gaze at a video monitor screen’, and ‘moving a computer mouse with one’s 
wrist’ are usually accepted as descriptions of what is “actually” happening in “RW.” 
Relative to understanding the situated use of computer technology for engaging in a 
virtual environment, Goffman’s construct of primary framework is thus useful for 
denoting that which is non-virtual. 
Goffman further notes that recognizing a situation implies the application of a 
primary framework, normally enabling its user to “come to terms with all events in 
that activity” (347). The primary framework imparts a sense of what is going on, and 
also guides that person’s actions, “informing and regulating many of them” (347). 
Thus an individual participating in a virtual world game would gear their real world 
actions to the conventions for playing that specific game (for example, certain 
keyboard shortcuts), even while their attention was focused on what was going on 
inside a virtual space. The notion of primary framework is nevertheless relative. To a 
human factors engineer concerned with force of key strokes, an ophthalmologist 
conducting an eye exam, or a mechanical engineer testing mouse performance, the 
frameworks mentioned above are likely superseded by other primary frameworks.7
 
7 Similarly, use of the expression “RW” implies that someone immersed in a “virtual” world is 
applying a non-RW frame as their primary framework.  
 
Thus Goffman’s Frame Analysis offers a way of distinguishing RW from ‘virtual 
worlds,’ and at the same time supporting explanation of activity in each.  
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4    Simulated Images and Processes 
The “environments” of virtual worlds are comprised of simulated images and 
processes enabled by technology, as in the case of the flight simulator. Yet to 
participants in virtual worlds, these simulated environments are perceived as virtual 
objects and events resembling real world objects and events. Goffman’s Frame 
Analysis offers a way to understand and explain these correspondences as well. To 
keep things simple, I start with an elementary case of a computer user working with 
virtual “folders” and “documents” on a virtual “desktop.”  Such simulated images 
and processes are so common today that it is easy to forget that mapping between 
“real” desktop, folders and documents on the one hand, and virtual desktop, folders 
and documents of graphical user interfaces on the other, was a major innovation 
historically,8
4. 1    Meaning in/of Simulated Images and Processes 
 and that understanding how to employ the analogic mapping was 
initially something of an exercise.  
For understanding the relation of simulated images and processes of on-screen 
‘desktop,’ ‘folders’ and ‘documents,’ to situated action, Goffman’s concepts of ‘key’ 
and ‘keying’ are useful. He describes these: 
 
a central concept in frame analysis:  the key. I refer here to the set of 
conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of 
some primary frameworks, is transformed into something patterned on this 
activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else. The 
process of transcription can be called keying. (43-44, emphases added) 9
 
 
The distinction between primary framework and keying is significant in terms of 
how the activity is described and its meaning.  Compared to a primary framework in 
which an activity is considered “real or actual, to be really or actually or literally 
occurring”, a keying of that activity is considered “not literal or real or actually 
occurring” (47). The examples that Goffman offers include, threat, deceit, ritual, 
staging, fantasizing, analyzing, etc.  
In the example of a virtual desktop with iconic folders and electronic documents, 
the set of conventions for representing “actual” desktop, folders and documents via 
iconic images can be understood as a key. The frame (organizational premises) may 
even be explicitly described in Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) design 
principles, linking a bitmap image of a folder and its associated functionality with a 
subjective experience or belief associated with ‘opening’ a folder to find 
‘documents’ ‘inside.’10
 
8 First invented by Doug Engelbart at SRI, the innovation was developed at Xerox PARC and 
then moved into production by Apple Computer, Inc. 
  Rather than typing on a keyboard as in the previous section, 
9 Goffman derives the term “keying” from an analogy to music—i.e. transcribing music from 
one key to another, although he acknowledges that musical “mode” rather than “key” might 
actually be more accurate (44). 
10 This is sometimes explained in HCI via reference to a ‘mental model’; I avoid that term 
because it implies the model resides within the subject, whereas Goffman’s frame and 
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the typist could now be understood/explained as relying on a specific key in 
perceiving herself as “typing a quarterly report”; the screen gazer employing another 
key in watching a live videocam stream; and the mouse user might describe his 
behavior as “formatting a marketing presentation.” 
Goffman notes that concomitant change in activity between a primary framework 
and a keying may be quite minor, but its effect on the descriptions that participants 
would offer relative to “what’s going on” can still be vast: 
 
the systematic transformation that a particular keying introduces may alter 
only slightly the activity thus transformed, but it utterly changes what it is 
a participant would say was going on . . . . A keying, then, when there is 
one, performs a crucial role in determining what it is we think is really 
going on. (45) 
 
The keying concept therefore provides a useful way of underscoring distinctions 
in perception and intent that accompany similar sets of actions in different virtual 
worlds, as for example between a claims processing clerk and a tech support 
engineer both pressing the same keys while gazing at the same simulated images on 
the same machine. Applying different keys to the same patterns of physical actions, 
the clerk is enacting the “paying claims” key, while the engineer could be invoking 
the key of “debugging a software glitch.” Goffman’s approach highlights how 
selection of a key is closely related to social conventions. This helps to account for 
the numerous cases in the literature on virtual teams where participants interpret 
simulated images and processes in ways consistent with their locally situated 
community or occupational group rather than consistent with other members of their 
virtual team [9-11].  
4.2   Immersion in Simulated Images and Processes  
The experience of feeling “immersed” in a virtual world is another common aspect 
of virtuality. For this, Goffman’s term ‘involvement’, which is a second aspect of 
frame, serves well. It denotes the extent to which an individual’s attention and 
emotions are focused on and engrossed in an activity.  
 
Frame, however, organizes more than meaning; it also organizes 
involvement. During any spate of activity, participants will ordinarily not 
only obtain a sense of what is going on but will also (in some degree) 
become spontaneously engrossed, caught up, enthralled. (345) 
 
Involvement in simulated images and processes, paired with keyings closely 
correlated with material reality, enables situated activity to seem convincingly real in 
a virtual sense. The more ‘involved’ the user becomes in the simulated images and 
processes, the more believable the transformational keying becomes.  
Goffman notes that frames normally include normative upper and lower bounds 
on involvement: “All frames involve expectations of a normative kind as to how 
deeply and fully the individual is to be carried into the activity organized by the 
frames” (345). Such norms associated with appropriate intensity of attention in 
                                                                             
organizational premises connote a more coherent bridging between organization of subjective 
experience and organization of (external) activity. 
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virtual worlds are revealed when degraded technological capabilities do not support 
normal involvement and comments of frustration over “slow response time” are 
heard. Similarly, people who frequently transgress the upper bounds on normative 
involvement may be labeled as “addicted to computers,” while those who operate 
below the lower bound are more likely to be considered “Luddites” or “computer 
illiterate.” Taking this approach one step further, another common attribute of 
virtuality is that simulated images and processes are often designed specifically to 
intensify involvement, as in the case of computer games.11
5    Virtual Interaction 
   
Virtual social interaction–as in computer-mediated interaction of a virtual team—
is a particularly important arena of virtuality. Interaction involves alternating turns of 
action by participants with attention directed toward a common focus of activity. In 
the co-present case, interaction also involves mutual monitoring and awareness by 
participants of each other and their alternating actions. Each participant responds (or 
reacts) to the actions of the other in turn, so that involvement in the interaction is 
thus mutually sustained. This is essentially the same set of dynamics with which HCI 
is concerned, albeit face-to-face and person-to-person, rather than person-to-
computer. 
Goffman points out that with regard to co-present interaction, if one participant’s 
attention wanders to something outside the mutual focus, the other will detect this 
deviation and not be able to sustain the interaction one-sidedly. In other words, if one 
participant fails to express proper involvement in the shared interaction, the other 
consequently/ necessarily also becomes less involved in the formerly mutually-
constructed and sustained activity. Highlighting this effect, Goffman posits that 
mutual involvement in co-present (social) interaction is thus an “interlocking 
obligation” (346, emphasis added).  
How and why such an ‘obligation’ is manifested and experienced in face-to-face 
interaction is a significant concern. According to Goffman scholar Anne Rawls:  
 
Goffman’s contribution to social theory consists in the idea of an 
interaction order sui generis which derives its order from constraints 
imposed by the needs of a presentational self rather than by social 
structure. . . .  He argued carefully over the course of his career that there 
were interactional prerequisites and needs of self which places constraints 
on interaction. . . . Persons conformed with these because if they did not 
their social selves would cease to exist. [12] 
 
Goffman offers numerous examples in which participants’ encounters with such 
constraints are marked by “embarrassment” or loss of ‘face’.  Scheff [13,14] further 
extends this perspective, positing a continuum of moral emotions ranging between 
pride and shame as the regulatory mechanism. In face-to-face interaction, bodily 
expressions of such feelings are usually evident in body language and facial 
expressions visible to other interactants.  
 
11 Goffman terms artifacts designed with this quality “engrossables” (345). 
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In virtual interaction, team members usually cannot directly monitor bodily 
expressions of each other’s involvement. Nevertheless, consistent with Goffman’s 
emphasis on observable action/expression of involvement, participants are often 
cognizant of external evidence of the other’s involvement as expressed through 
recognizable action, for example, whether the person at the other end has responded 
to email or contributed expected deliverables. Even though the interaction is 
mediated, an attenuated version of interlocking obligation still applies. Examples of 
interactional constraints, based on needs of presentational self in a virtual team and 
contingent upon electronic signals of involvement, include the guilt experienced 
when delaying a response to an urgent email or the concern felt when seeing one’s 
work forwarded by others to a broader audience. Repeated occurrences of 
interlocking obligation build trust for continuing interactions in the future and are 
especially significant for supporting virtual interaction over longer time periods.  
Goffman’s terminology and concepts also support viewing interlocking 
obligation as attenuated through technological mediation.  In virtual interaction, ICT 
reduces the dimensions of expressed involvement to digital images and processes, 
thereby making it more difficult for participants to ascertain whether each ‘other’ is 
indeed genuinely involved because the bodily expressions of involvement normally 
recognizable in co-presence are not readily perceivable. This can help account for the 
abundance of spam, junkmail, phishing, and online predators in virtual worlds: the 
mediating technology acts as an “involvement shield,” obscuring one participant’s 
fabrication of involvement, with the interaction eventually breaking down as failures 
in interlocking obligation become evident.  
6    Discussion 
As described above, the situated nature of important aspects of virtuality can be 
explained using features of Goffman’s Frame Analysis. These aspects of virtuality 
include contrast with the “real world”; meaning of simulated images and processes; 
immersion in them; and virtual interaction. Here I briefly consider a higher-level 
view of how this approach might contribute to understanding the broader interaction 
of interdependent social and technological phenomena; I use virtual teams as an 
illustrative example.  
For virtual teams, it seems reasonable to assume that congruence [6] across team 
members’ frames is important. In Goffman’s terms, this entails isomorphic 
organizational premises – or linkages between their frameworks of understanding 
and their external activities – that ultimately require some version of parallelism in 
the material aspects of their ICT. This suggests the possibility of viewing two 
separate layers of interaction, one social and one technological, each with its own 
(separate) logic of interaction, which also interact with each other at numerous 
points. The two layers can be understood as two sides of a coin: one side is 
technological interoperability, the other side involves social practices effecting 
‘transcription’ of keyings. Both layers or sides are distributed geographically, and 
stitched together at various points (physical locations) through human-computer 
interaction (HCI).  
On the technological side, interoperability (of ICT) is important because it 
affords a material basis for congruence across organizational premises of team 
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members’ frames. On the human/social side, frame congruence across dispersed 
team members can be understood as achieved via transcriptions shaped by a 
transitive set of interlocking obligations across locations. This view highlights the 
importance of complementarity between social practices that shape meaning (frames 
of understanding) and individuals’ involvement in these practices.  
How congruence between frames of understanding and frames is actually 
achieved when team members are dispersed, and how this congruence is maintained 
or repeatedly reconstructed in parallel across space and time, are issues that 
Goffman’s Frame Analysis does not address. Another limitation of his approach is a 
reliance on conceptual typifications [15] with little explanation (apart from 
references to ritual and social convention) of how people ascertain which frame is 
appropriate to use in any specific situation. That virtual teams actually work as well 
as they do testifies to the diligence and creativity of individual virtual team members 
willing to initiate activities such as phone calls and face-to-face meetings which 
enable them to bring their frames into congruence and create/restore interlocking 
obligation, compensating for its attenuation via mediated technology. 
One promising avenue for integrating Frame Analysis with more practice-based 
approaches is via ethnomethodology. Originating in work by Harold Garfinkel, the 
ethnomethodological approach has been identified as a good complement to 
Goffman’s frame analysis [15].12
7    Conclusion 
 Furthermore, the ethnomethodological approach 
has already shown promise in the study of computer-supported cooperative work 
[16,17]. The combination, therefore, may well afford a fruitful way ahead.  
In this paper I have argued that Goffman’s Frame Analysis offers a powerful 
approach (or in Goffman’s terminology a useful “key”) for understanding important 
aspects of virtuality from a situated perspective. Goffman’s terminology and 
concepts afford strong potential for integrating the study of virtual action and 
interaction with much of what is already known about social action and interaction 
more generally.13
To recap: the contrast between the “real world” and virtual worlds can be 
understood through Goffman’s concept of primary framework. How people interact 
with simulated images and processes can be explained via Goffman’s notions of key 
and keying. The phenomenal experience of immersion while using ICT (especially 
ICT “engrossables”) is well-characterized by Goffman’s description of involvement – 
including both cognitive and affective components. And virtual interaction (as in a 
  His frame analysis provides language and concepts for 
distinguishing virtual worlds from each other and from real worlds, in a way that is 
consonant with important aspects of human-computer interaction. It also helps to 
account for the phenomenon of immersion in virtual worlds while at the same time it 
is better suited for understanding both co-present and mediated social interaction. 
 
12 Garfinkel helped to inspire Goffman’s development of Frame Analysis (Anne Rawls, 
personal communication, March 6, 2007). 
13 Goffman’s work underlies and informs much of contemporary sociological and social 
theory [18]. 
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virtual team) can be accounted for with Goffman’s notions of interlocking obligation 
and parallel or complementary organizational premises.  
There are several possibilities for further research utilizing these and other 
aspects of Goffman’s frame approach. First, more thorough analyses of the 
relation(s) between co-present (social) interaction, human-computer interaction, and 
computer-mediated (social) interaction should be carried out. Such research may lead 
to clearer categorization of similarities and differences between these alternate forms 
of interaction. If this proves valuable, the approach could then be further extended to 
clarify how these different kinds of interaction can be portrayed in work on 
organizing practices involving ICT such as Yates and Orlikowski’s [19-21] genre 
approach and Orlikowski’s [22] work on scaffolding, as well as in Actor Network 
Theory [23,24]. While the road ahead remains challenging, selected aspects of 
Goffman’s Frame Analysis appear to offer an approach worth pursuing. 
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